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The  optimal  income  taxation  literature  began  with  the  seminal  paper  of Mirrlees  (1971).  In  a
society  composed  of  individuals  with  different  exogenous  income  earning  possibilities,  Mirrlees
characterizes  the  best  income  tax  function  a  social  planner  (or government)  can implement.  In
his context,  'best'  must  be understood  with  reference to  (i) the  reaction  of the  individuals  to the
tax  function,  and  (ii) the  objective of the  planner.  The recognition  of (i) is the  main  contribution
of Mirrlees to this  literature.  Indeed,  he introduced  explicitly,  in a tractable  way and  for the  first
time,  the  (dis)incentive  effects associated  with the  taxation  of  (endogenous)  income.  In  defining
(ii),  Mirrlees  followed the  tradition  in welfare  economics  by  postulating  that  the  government
maximizes  a social welfare  function,  i.e.  a function  depending  solely on the  individuals'  welfare,
social judgements  and preferences  being present  through  the  weights  assigned  to different  agents'
well-being.  Mirrlees'  approach  is in this  sense  "welfarist".
Welfarism has been  criticized  on several grounds.  In a stream  of important  papers  gathered  in
a  single book,  Sen  (1982) argues  that  welfarism  is informationally  restrictive.  Welfarism  rejects
any  information  unrelated  to  personal  individual  welfare,  i.e.  non-utility  information.  Such in-
formation  is given for instance  by the  possibility  to exercise one's  'rights',  the  freedom to express
one's  views  or  ethical  concepts  such  as  'liberty',  'justice',  etc.  FRom a  policy  standpoint  also,
welfarism is considered  too  narrow  to provide sound  policy prescriptions.  Many  important  issues
are  missed or simply  left out  by the  welfarist  approach.
There  are principles  of social judgement  that  require  essential  use of non-utility  infor-
mation,  and  while  such principles  (e.g., liberty,  non-exploitation,  non-discrimination)
are typically  not much discussed in traditional  welfare economics, they  do relate  closely
to the  subject  matter  of welfare economics.  [Sen (1982), p.  338]
Alternative  approaches  to policy analysis,  using non-utility  information,  have been  developed
following the  work of Sen (1982).  These  approaches  are usually  ranked  under  the  generic  term  of
1'nonwelfarist'.
In setting  the policy agenda,  a social planner  may then  want  to take into account,  utility  as well
as non-utility  information,  departing  from the usual welfarist approach.  In the economics literature
however, the welfarist  and  nonwelfarist  viewpoints  have been  adopted  each to the exclusion  of the
other.  A recent  exception  is however provided  by Atkinson  (1995a) who  explicitly  recognizes that
a government  can pursue  several  objectives  and  has to  combine  them  in a sensible  way:
The objectives of securing individual freedom, avoiding dependency,  or rewarding  effort
do not replace  concern for the welfare of individual.s.  Rather  we have now to recognize
that  we have a plurality  of principles.  [Atkinson  (1995a) p.  63]
Atkinson  therefore  advocates  a  social  objective  function  that  trades  off different,  possibly
conflicting,  concerns.  While  this  would take  us  away fromn  the  welfarist  approach,  in this  paper
we stick to  the  latter  while accounting  for the  multidimensionality  of welfare.
According  to Sugden (1993), the industry  standard  in welfare economics is 'revealed  preference
welfarism'  where  the  welfare of  an individual  is associated  with  the  actions  she  undertakes.  For
instance,  in  the  optimal  taxation  literature,  a  person's  welfare  is  the  utility  derived  from  the
bundle  she chooses to consume.  There  are, however, many  other  dimensions  to welfare.
This paper  proposes  a procedure  that  allows (some) a priori non-utility  information  to be taken
into  account  within  a  welfarist  approach.  For welfarism  to  accommodate  such  information,  the
latter  must  be  'welfarized'.  Let  us consider  aggregate  poverty  to  illustrate.  A  person  is poor  if
she  is short  of a given amount  of income  that  would allow her to attain  a given  'decent'  standard
of living.  For each  such  person,  a  measure  of poverty  can be  computed,  using  indexes that  have
been  proposed  in the  literature,  aggregate  poverty  being  the  sum  of  all  these  measures.  It  is
broadly  accepted  that  people  are  not  indifferent  with  respect  to  self- or  others'  deprivation  as
suggested  by the following quotes  "[One might] feel depressed  at  the  sight  of misery"  [Sen (1982),
p.  8], and  "If taxpayers  care about  reducing  the  visible signs of poverty  [...]" [Besley and  Coate
2(1995),  p.  189]. It  is also generally  thought  that  poverty  can  lead to  criminality.  If so,  poverty
can  then  be harmful  for a  society  and  it  is considered  here  as an  aggregate  negative  externality
or  public  "bad"  that  reduces  the  utility  of the  individuals.  It  is then  a kind  of diffuse externality
that  Meade  labeled  "atmosphere"  externalities.  When  the  planner  proposes  a  tax  schedule,  each
individual  chooses the  bundle  she prefers,  revealing  her preferences,  but  does not  choose the  level
of externality,  although  it also affects her well-being.
Considering poverty, which is a non-utility  information,  as an externality  is one way to welfarize
it.  People  may  still  have  different  degrees of  aversion  to  poverty.  If ones  takes  the  criminality
interpretation,  people may  be affected differently  because of their  geographic  location.  Sensitivity
to poverty  may  simply  differ among  the  individuals.  Once the  non-welfare  information  has  been
welfarized, one can accomodate  it in the standard  social welfare function  and get back to welfarism.
The social welfare function  is then  a function  of the  'comprehensive'  individuals'  welfares.  In  the
following, when  the  planner  considers  comprehensive  welfare,  he is labeled  a 'poverty  as a  public
bad'  (ppb)  planner  to distinguish  it with  the  (standard)  welfarist  planner.
This  paper  is obviously  not  the  first  to  consider  poverty  as  an  externality.  The  idea can  be
traced  back at  least  to Zeckhauser  (1971) who considers  a representative  citizen  proposing  income
transfer  mechanisms  to poor  people. in order  to reduce  the  externality  the  latter  produce.  In  his
setup  only  the  rich  are  affected  by the  externality  and  he  only  considers  linear  taxation.  The
closest paper  to ours  is that  of Kanbur,  Keen and  Tuomala  (1994).  Their  objective  is to find the
shape of the nonlinear  tax  schedule that  most  alleviates  poverty, measured  by a given index.  They
then consider a Mirrleesian problem  in which the  objective function  is replaced by an income-based
poverty  index.  Their  approach  is non-welfarist  since individuals'  utility  appears  only in the  self
selection  constraints  from  which  the  government  cannot  escape.  They  obtain  some  interesting
results  such  as  the  negativity  of  the  optimal  marginal  tax  rate  at  the  lower  end  of the  scale,
even though  this  feature  is not  confirmed  by their  simulations.  A more general,  but  completely
overlooked,  approach  is Seade  (1979) who discusses  the  properties  of the  optimal  tax  schedule  a
3non-utilitarian  govermnent,  which  can  have any  objective  not  directly  linked  to the  individuals'
welfare,  has  to  implement.  Besley  and  Coate  (1992,  1995)  also  offer  an  interesting  study  for
income maintenance  programs.  They focus on the  effectiveness of workfare  schemes in minimizing
of  the  cost  of  these  programs.  Their  papers  do  not,  however,  include  a  budget  constraint;  in
this  paper  only  self-financing  policies  are  considered.  GOremer  et  al.  (1998) reconsider  also the
optimal  design  of the  tax  system  in the  presence  of an  aggregate  externality.  However, in their
study,  the  externality  is produced  by  a  consumption  good  while  in our  case  it  comes from  the
paucity  of income.  Even  though  in both  papers  only aggregate  externality  matters,  its  nature  is
different.  Indeed,  in Cremer  et  al.  there  is no threshold  effect and  any  additional  consumption
of the  externality  good  increases the  level of the  aggregate  externality,  while  in this  paper  only a
proportion  of the  population  creates  an externality  even though  everybody  enjoys  income.  They
also consider  both  income  and  commodity  taxation,  whereas  this  paper  is only  concerned  with
income  taxation.
The  remainder  of the  chapter  is organized  as follows.  The  next  section  presents  the  general
structure  of the economy.  Section 3 investigates  the  benchmark  case of complete information.  Sec-
tion 4 is devoted to the asymmetric  information  economy and deals with nonlinear  taxation.Section
5 derives an explicit  solution  of the  nonlinear  tax  schedule  for quasilinear  preferences;  and  numer-
ical  simulations  for specific  poverty  index,  poverty  line  and  distribution  of  skills are  conducted.
Section  6.  concludes.
2  The  Model
Following the  traditional  income taxation  literature,  it is assumed  that  individuals  have the  same
preferences with regard to the only two goods present in the  economy, namely  consumption,  x, and
labor,  y.  Preferences  are represented  by a utility  function  u(x, y) which  is assumed  to be  strictly
concave on (x, y), at least twice continuously  differentiable,  increasing  in x and decreasing  in y.  The
4economy consists  of a  continuum  of such  individuals  parameterized  by a  single variable  n,  which
represents  their  income-generating  possibilities  or  productivity.  This  parameter  is  distributed
according  to  the  density  function  f(n)  and  the  cumulative  distribution  function  F(n)  over the
support  [n,-n].
For  any  agent  of  productivity  n  who  works  y  units  of  time,  her  gross  income  is given  by
z = n* y. Let  us define U(x, z, n) -u(x,  z/n)  and  impose the  condition  of Agent  Monotonicity  of
Seade (1982)
(AM)  sn -as(x,  z, nr)/an < 0 V (x, z)
where  s(x,  z, n) -- U(x,  z,n)/U,(x,  z,n)  > 0 is the  marginal  rate  of substitution  between  gross
income  and  consumption.  This  condition  states  that  at  any point  (x, z)  in the  consumption-gross
income  space,  the  indifference  curves  are  flatter  the  higher  the  productivity  of the  agent.  This
is also assumption  B of Mirrlees  (1971) and  the  usual  single  crossing  condition  of  the  screening
literature.
Each individual  chooses the amount  of labor to supply depending  on the  tax  schedule x = ((z),
relating  gross income to consumption,  the social planner  proposes.  By picking up a specific bundle
(x, z)  from the  proposed  tax  schedule,  the  individual  reveals  that  it is her preferred  bundle  which
is the  one  that  maximizes  the  component  of her welfare  she  has  a  control  upon,  namely  u(x, y)
that  is labeled  here 'intrinsic'  utility.  However, her  "true"  welfare depends  also on other  variables
that  are out  of her control.
It  is  assumed  that  the  only  relevant  feature  of  the  social  state  that  affects  the  welfare  of
individuals  is the  level of  poverty  that  exists  in the  society.  Poverty  can  affect welfare  if, as  it
is often argued,  it  is among  the  main  social  causes  for the  emergence  of crime.  Another  simple
argument  is that  people just  dislike to  live in  or  cohabit  with  misery.  Let  us denote  by  P  the
aggregate  level of poverty  that  will be made explicit later  in the  analysis.  The overall welfare level
5of an  n-agent  choosing  the  bundle  (x(n),  z(n))  is therefore
V(x(n),z(n),n,P)  = U(x(n),z(n),n)  - 3(n)P  (1)
where  3(n),  which  is common  knowledge,  measures  the  ave:rsion to poverty  of the  n-agents.  The
agents  are poverty-lovers  if it  is negative,  indifferent  if it  equals  zero  and  poverty-averse  if it is
strictly  positive.  The  (loss of) welfare of the  agents  derived  from  the  sight  of poverty  is labeled
'extrinsic'  welfare.1
The  government  wants  to  choose the  tax  schedule  x  =:  (z)  that  maximizes  social  welfare,
which is the  sum of the  individuals'  true  welfare.  Its objective  is therefore:
rn
Max,=E(Z) j  V(x(n), z(n), 9, P)f(n)dn  (2)
The  government  also  must  consider  the  reaction  of the  individuals  with  respect  to  this  budget
constraint  and  the  resource  constraint.  This  latter  is given by
/  (z(n)  - x(n))f(n)dn  =  (3)
where  R  is the  revenue  the  government  wants  to  levy for  the  financing  of  (say)  a  public  good.
When it is zero, the planner  is only concerned by redistribution.  When faced with the tax  schedule,
the  agents  choose the  amount  of  labor  to  supply  in order  to  maximize  their  welfare.  Since the
extrinsic  welfare is treated  parametrically,  the  individuals  in fact only maximize  the  intrinsic part
of  their  welfare.  The  incentive  problem  is left  unaffected  by  the  introduction  of the  aggregate
externality  and  is therefore  the  same  as  that  under  the  traditional  income  taxation  literature.
The  first order  condition  is
UI  x'(n)  + Uz -z'(n)  = 0  or  u(n)  ==  U,(x(n),  z(n),  n)  (4)
dn
which is the  second constraint  the  government  has to consider.  Where u(n)  is the  indirect intrinsic
utility,  that  is the  maximum  utility  the  individual  can  get  from  the  tax  schedule.  Note  that  we
I The  different  components  of the  true  welfare  are  taken  to  be separable.  This  assumption  seems  quite  natural
since  the  agents  have  no  control  over  the  second  component  and  behave  parametrically  with  respect  to  it.
6are  taking  the  first-order  approach  to the  problem,  i.e., only first  order  constraints  are  included.
To ensure  that  the  tax  schedule derived  from this  problem  is implementable  and  the  optimal  one,
it must  be  verified  that  the  resulting  gross  income  is a nondecreasing  function  of ability,  which
means that  the  second-order  constraint  is fulfilled. 2
It  remains  now to describe  the  precise form of the  aggregate  externality.  Poverty  is considered
in this  paper  in its  narrowest  sense.  Indeed,  deprivation  is defined solely in terms  of income.  An
individual  is poor  if her disposable  income falls short  of a  prespecified  level x* called  the  poverty
line in the  poverty  literature.  The  poverty  line helps  to  identify  poor  people  in a  society.  The
second step  then  consists of measuring  the  extent  of poverty by constructing  a poverty  index.  The
measurement  of poverty  has generated  a huge literature  which  survey is beyond  the  scope of this
paper,  the  interested  reader  is referred  to Ravallion  (1994).  Several measures  of poverty exist; this
paper  focuses on  measures  that  take  into  account  not  only its  existence,  but  also its  severity.3
The poverty  measure  of an agent whose consumption  is x is then  given by the  function  P(x,  x*),
satisfying  the  conditions  P(x,  x8)  > 0,  Px(x,  x*)  <  0 and  P,,(x,  x*)  >  0 for  all x  E  [0,  x*).
Finally  P(x,  x*)  = 0 for x >  x* and  P(x*,  x*)  = Px(x*,  x*) = 0. The  poverty  index  used  here,
which  aggregates  all individual  poverty  measures,  is supposed  to belong  to the  class of additively
decomposable  indices.  For a given poverty  line, poverty  in the  economy is measured  by: 4
In
P(z*= P(x(n),  x*)f(n)dn
where  {x(n), n E  [n,  -]  } is the  consumption  profile in the  economy.
The objective  of the  government  is therefore  to choose the  tax  schedule  to
n
Max  {u(n)  - 3flP(x(n),  x*)} f(n)dn  (5)
2 Introducing  explicitly  the  second  order  constraint  allows  to  deal  with  bunching  problems  which  are  not  the
primary  focus  of the  paper.  On  this  see  Ebert  (1992),  Mirrlees  (1986),  Brito  and  Oakland  (1977)  among  others.
3 The  Headcount  ratio,  for  instance,  indicates  only  what  proportion  of the  population  is  poor  and  thus  deals
only  with  the  existence  of poverty.  More  sophisticated  measures  have  been  proposed  in  the  literature  to  deal  with
the  intensity  of poverty,  for  instance  the  P.  or FGT  measures  introduced  by  Foster,  Greer  and  Thorbecke  (1984).
For  a good  and  comprehensive  survey,  the  reader  is referred  to  Atkinson  (1987).
4 The  index  chosen  here  is  very  general  and  has  many  indices  as  special  cases.  However,  given  its  assumed
properties,  the  Sen  (1982,  Essay  17) types  of measures,  which  are  based  on  a Gini  index,  are  precluded.
7under  the  differential  equation  (4) which  represents  the  incentive  compatibility  constraints  and
the  resource  constraint  (3).  The parameter  ,l  - f/3(n)dF  is the  average  or  social  aversion  to
poverty  and  can  be  computed  by  the  government  since  individual  aversions  are  known.5 It  is
(reasonably)  assumed  to be  strictly  positive,  i.e., the society  is, on average,  averse to misery.
3  The  First-Best
Let  us first  consider  a  first-best  world  in  which  the  government  knows  who  is of  what  ability.
The  agents do not  have  the  possibility  to mimick other  lower ability  agents  and  the  government
can  directly  impose  consumption-labor  bundles  that  are  contingent  on the  individuals'  produc-
tivity.  The incentive  problem  having  vanished,  only the  resource  constraint  (3) needs then  to be
considered.  The  maximization  program  is therefore  as follows: {  Max  f{u(x(n),y(n))  - 13P(x(;2t),x*)}f(n)dn.
subject  to  f,'(ny(n)  - x(n)  - )f(n)dn  > 0
The  first  order  conditions  are  easily  derived  and  one  obtains  ux  - 3Px  =  y, uy  =  -n-y  and
s =  -uy/nu.  =  y/(-y + ,3P).  The marginal  social valuation  of an additional  unit  of consumption
is equated  among  all the  individuals.  This  condition  boils  down to the  equalization  of marginal
utilities  in  a  utilitarian  framework  or  if the  society  is indifferent  to  poverty  (3  =  0).  In  this
setting  however, income  has an additional  positive impact  through  the  reduction  of poverty which
is valued  by  the  society  at  the  rate  ,3.  One of  the  most  prominent  features  of income  transfer
mechanisms  is the  marginal  rate  of tax  the  agents face since it captures  the  (dis)incentive  effects
5  This  objective  is obtained  after  the  following  transformations:
j  V(xr(n), z(n),  n, P(x*))dF  =  U(x(n),  z(n),  n)dF  - P(x')  In  ((n)dF
J  n  Jnn
= j  u(n)dF  - I  OP(x(n),  x*)dF  =  X  -(n)-  P(x(-),  *)}dF.
Thanks  to  the  separability  between  the  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  welfares  and  to  the  decomposability  properties  of
the  poverty  index,  the  social  welfare  which  originally  takes  into  account  the  individual  aversions,  /3(n),  to  social
poverty,  can  be expressed  equivalently  by  using  the  social  aversion,  /3,  to  individual  poverty.
8and  hence  distortions  associated  with  a given  mechanism.  In  our  first  best  world,  the  marginal
tax  rate  for the  n-agents  is given by:
1  (x ((n) y(n))  13P,(x(n), x*)s(x(n),  y(n))  _  3Px(z(n), x*)  (6)
It  is immediately  apparent  that  those  whose consumption  is above the  poverty  line face no dis-
tortion  and  receive lump-sum  transfers  as is usual  in a complete  information  setup.  Interestingly
however, the  poor  face a negative  marginal  tax  rate,  which basically  amounts  to earnings  subsi-
dies.6 By subsidizing  their  earnings  at  the  margin,  the  government  induces  the  poor  to work
harder,  earn  even more  income  and  thereby  reduce  the  negative  externality  they  create.  It  is in
fact a kind of corrective  Pigouvian  subsdidy  which make agents internalize  the  externality.  Indeed,
the  subsidy  on  the  last  earned  unit  of income  is equal to  its  marginal  social  benefit  measured  in
terms  of (this  individual)  poverty  reduction.  The Pigouvian  subsidy  is however  nonlinear,  i.e., it
is not  the  same for everybody  and  depends  on the  level of consumption.  Poorer  individuals  are
offered higher subsidies.  The  subsidy  is also higher in societies  that  are  more averse to poverty.
It  is also of interest  to  determine  the  optimal  distribution  of consumption  and  labor  in the
economy.  This  problem  has  received  much  attention  in  the  standard  welfarist  framework,  see
for instance  Sadka  (1976).  It  is easy to  show that  the  optimal  allocation  requires  the  supply  of
labor  to  be  an  increasing  function  of productivity.  For efficiency reasons,  the  more  productive
an  agent is the  more she  works.  The  redistribution  of the  income  so produced  depends  mainly
on the  preferences.  For  instance,  if they  are  separable  between  consumption  and  labor,  the  op-
timal  consumption  allocation  is the  egalitarian  one.  The  consumption  pattern  depends  on the
Edgeworth-complementarity  of consumption  and  leisure,  i.e.,  on the  sign of u,.  The  following
proposition  (proof  in the  appendix)  summarizes  the  results  of this  section.
6 Zeckhauser  (1971)  presents  a similar  result  even  though  in his  setting  only  the  representative  rich citizen  suffers
from  poverty  externality.
9Proposition  1  The  optimal  allocation (x(n),y(n))  is such  that:
(i)  all nonpoor  receive lump-sum  transfers  while poor  individuals  face  a  corrective nonlinear
(unless preferences  are separable) Pigouvian  subsidy,
(ii)  the supply  of labor is an increasing function  of ability,  i.e.,  dy(n)/dn  > 0,
(iii)  the  consumption  function  pattern  depends  on  the  Edgeworth-complementarity  betuween
consumption  and leisure,  i.e., dx(n)/dn  u.,  > 0.
4  Unobservable  Abilities
This section  considers  the  case where  the  productivity  of an agent  is private  information  which is
by no means available to the  government.  Let  us, for the  sake of clarity,  restate  the  maximization
program  of the  government:
ln
Maxx(n),z(n)  j  {u(n)  -13P(z(n),  x*)} f(n)dn
subject  to
d(n-) =  Un(x(n),  z(n),  n)  and  I  (z(n)  - x(n))f(n)dn=rR dn  n
This is a usual optimal  control  problem  with the  indirect  intrinsic  utility  u(n)  as the  state  variable
and  earned  income z(n)  as the  control  variable.  The  multipliers  associated  to the  constraints  are,
,a(n) and  -y, respectively  and  the  formal resolution  of the  problem  is postponed  to the  appendix.
Assuming  that  it is optimal  for everybody  to work and  t:hat there  is no bunching,  the  marginal
tax  rate  faced by an  n-agent  is given by:
t(z(n))  =  (1-  s(x(n),z(n),n))  =  ±i}-+  1t(n)Uxsn  (7)
where
pL(n)  =  X(U  - P  - -Y)  (1/U.)exp  (J  (Jnx/U.)dm)  f(p)dp  (8)
with  the  endpoint  conditions
t(_)  = POT-)  =  O.  (9)
It  is easy to show that  u(n)  <  0  for n  E  (n,-nf). Indeed,  because  of the  transversality  conditions
(9), the  integrand  cannot  be always positive  or negative,  it must  change  sign at  least  once.  Since
10P  is a convex function  of x which is increasing  with n, then  -P.  is a decreasing  function;  so is U,.
Hence the  integrand  Ux - (/PI  +  y), which is the  marginal  social benefit  of giving an  additional
unit  of income  to an  agent  in a lump  sum manner,  is monotonically  decreasing  and  must  change
sign only once.  It  must  be  positive  for low values of n  and  negative  for high  values,  hence  the
negativity  of  ,t. FRom equation  (8) we can also deduce  that  -y > 0.  Contrary  to the  welfarist  case,
it is no longer possible to assess the sign of the marginal  tax  rate  solely from the  sign of jt,  because
there  is a second effect at  play  here, which  is that  of poverty  reduction.
To better  understand  the  optimal  tax schedule  chosen by the government,  let  us rewrite  equa-
tion  (7) in the  following more telling way:
[(1 -s(x(n),z(n),  n)) - ,_  f (n)  'n  d  [dn)]  (10)
I  l~~~y  I  - 7[dn  J(0
where  Uxsn  =  -a  [du(n)/dn]  /oz.  Departures  from  the  first-best  and  hence  distortions  are  cap-
tured by the right  hand  side of (10) which has the  same form than  in the standard  problem.  While
in the  familiar  income tax  literature  the relevant  distortions  are individual  distortions,  in our set-
ting one must  consider  social distortions.  These latter  answer to the  following question:  how does
the  incentive problem oblige the society  (or its representant,  the planner)  to move from its  optimal
allocation?  Social distortions  are  a  mere  generalization  of individual  distortion.  Indeed,  in the
standard  welfarist problem,  individual  and  social distortions  coincide since individual  decisions do
not  have any  impact  on  the  society  as  a  whole.  On  the  contrary,  in this  setup,  when  an  agent
chooses a  consumption  level that  falls below  the  poverty  line,  she  takes  a  decision  that  affects
the  society  through  her  contribution  to the  aggregate  negative  externality.  Individual  distortions
exist when the  marginal  tax  rate  is different from zero i.e., people receive non lump-sum  transfers,
while social distortions  are present  whenever the  left hand  side of (10) is not zero.  Along the  same
line  than  Brito  and  Oakland  (1977) it  is possible  to  provide  a  clear  economic  interpretation  to
equation  (10).  The  left hand  side of this  equation,
[(1-s(x(n),z(n),n))-  Ps]  f(n)
11is simply the  marginal  social benefit from the  n-agents  on the last  unit  of income  they  are required
to earn.  The  marginal  tax  rate  1 - s(x(n),  z(n), n)  is the  amount  the  government  retains  on the
additional  unit of income earned by the  n-agent which is to be redistributed  directly  or indirectly  if
it is positive.  If, on the contrary,  it is negative,  it is the  cost  the government  has to bear  to induce
the  agent to earn  this  last unit.  Therefore  s(x(n),  z(n), n)  is the  increase in consumption  that  must
be  given to the  agent  for her to voluntarily  earn  this  last; unit  of income.  Once poverty  is taken
into  consideration,  this  increase  in consumption  entails  a  marginal  reduction  in  the  contibution
to poverty  of these  individuals  which  value to  society  is -iP  s/y  in  terms  of the  government's
revenue.7 The  marginal  benefit  is greater  the  higher the  number  of these  individuals  f(n).
The right  hand  side  of (10) can  similarly  be  interpreted  as  the  marginal  social  cost  imposed
by the  presence  of the  incentive  compatibility  constraints.  It  is clear  that  -ti(n)  is the  cost the
planner  has  to bear  if it wants  to  increase the  utility  of the  type-n  individual  by one  unit.  This
cost  is implied  by the  existence  of all the  potential  mimickers  of n-agents,  i.e.  all p-agents  with
p  >  n.  U2-  OP., - -y is the  marginal  social  benefit  of allocating  one  unit  of consumption  to  the
p-individual.  It  is the  difference between  the  marginal  social valuation  (U., -,3P,)  - where both
the  effects on welfare  and  poverty  are  counted  for  -and  the  cost  of this  unit  in  terms  of  the
government's  revenue  (-y). The  number  of units  of consumption  z  needed  to  increase  the  utility
of the  p-consumer  by one  unit  is (1/Us).  Thus  -(U.  - 3.P2  - -y) x  (1/Us)  is the  cost  to bear  to
increase  the  utility  of the  p-agent  by one  unit followed by an increase  of one unit  of the  utility  of
the  n-agent.8
The total  cost of this operation  is obtained  when the  rate  of change of the  utility  of the p-agent
7 To reason  in  terms  of an  increase  of one  unit  of labor  is  straightforward  and  only  requires  rewritting  equation
(10)  the  following  way  [(1-  s(z(n),z(n),n))  - 6P`]nf(n)  =  (-  2..a [du]n)'
8  Note  that  the  cost  (or  benefit)  of an  additional  unit  of income  is measured  taking  into  account  both  intrinsic
welfare  and  the  impact  on  poverty,  while  the  number  of units  of  consumption  needed  to  increase  the  utility  of
the  agent  is  measured  solely  with  respect  to  the  intrinsic  welfare.  Indeed,  while  the  former  captures  the  societal
valuation  of income,  the  latter  shows  that  individual  incentives  depend  only  on  intrinsic  welfare.
12is introduced.  This  is given by
T,p  = exp  (j (Unm/U.)dm)
with U,  =  -xU  z/n2 . When  preferences are separable  between  consumption  and  leisure, U  =0
implying  Tp  =  1 increasing  the  utility  of  the  n-agent  by one  unit  requires  to  also  increase  the
utility  of  all  p-agents  (with  p  >  n),  by  one  unit  to  respect  the  self  selection  constraints.  If
consumption  and leisure are Edgeworth-substitutes  (U,= > 0) then  U,,  < 0, implying that  Tnp < 1
and  for an  increase of one unit of the  n-agent,  the necessary  increase in the  utility  of those who are
more productive  is less than  one  unit.  The social  cost, for an increase  of one  unit  in the  utility  of
the n-agent,  imposed by the p consumers is thus  -(Us  -3P.  -'y)(1/U.)Tnp.  Integrating  over p > n
gives the  aggregate  cost  the  planner  has to pay, i.e.  -j(n).  The  only instrument  the  government
has  at its  disposal  to effectuate  such an  increase  in utility  is to  alter  the  tax  schedule  to produce
this  effect on the  nth  consumer;  a  [d-(n)]  gives the  change  in the  utility  of the  n-agent  that  is
needed for the  incentive compatibility  constraints  still to hold when she is required  to increase her
pre-tax  income  by one unit.
The  rhs  of  (10) is thus  the  marginal  cost  of inducing  the  n-agent  to  earn  one  more  unit  of
income  in terms  of the  distortions  that  arise due  to  the  presence  of more  skilled workers.  This
cost is given in terms  of the  government's  revenue.
Equations  (7) or  (10) tell thus  nothing  else than  the  usual economic  rule which  states  that  at
the  optimum  the  marginal  social  costs of  extracting  one  more  unit  of labor,  from  any  agent  of
given productivity,  must  be equal  to the marginal  social benefits.
The formula  characterizing  the  marginal  tax  rate  (7) is rather  interesting.  The distortion  any
individual  must  face has  two components.  The second term  of equation  (7) has the  same form than
the  one encountered  in the  familiar  income taxation  literature  and  stems  only from  the  existence
of  asymmetric  information  which  forces  the  planner  to  introduce  distortions  to  satisfy  the  self
selection  constraints.  On  the  contrary,  the  first  term  captures  the  'first-best  distortion'  i.e.  the
13distortion the agent must face if productivities were observable, it is the term that  is obtained in
equation (6) and arises because of the need to induce agents to internalize the externality they
produce.9  Rewritting (7) as
1-  s(x(n), z(n), n) = LLnEUS'  l3PrS 1
it is clear that  marginal tax rate  is the difference  between the marginal cost induced by private
information and the marginal benefit from the reduction of the externality.  The above equation
shows that  all the non-poor people face a positive marginal tax rate.  Indeed, for the non-poor,
the last term in the rhs is zero. It  has been shown that  the first term is strictly positive except
at the top and bottom of the distribution, thanks to the transversality conditions. Therefore, the
marginal tax rate  1 - s is strictly positive for the non poor. It is however zero for the most able
since consumption is increasing x'(n) > 0 implying x(-nT  > x* and there exist non poor. Thus the
no distortion at the top result applies as long as not eveiybody is poor at the optimum. Moreover,
this rate is of precisely the same structure  than that  proposed by the welfarist planner.  Using
continuity arguments, some poor people also must face a positive marginal tax rate at least just
below the poverty line. The lower segment of the distribution must face a negative marginal tax
rate. Let us for instance consider the least able agents. From the transversality condition, the first
term in the above equation is zero and their consumption is below the poverty line so the marginal
tax they face is negative, their earnings are subsidized al; the margin, which induces them to work
hard. The planner is ready to subsidize  the marginal unit of earned income whenever  the marginal
benefit associated with it is greater than  the marginal cost.
Why does the introduction of poverty concerns lead to the apparition of negative MTR while
this never happens in the usual welfarist context? The iollowing answer is offered. The welfarist
planner  aims, in fine, at  redistributing utility.  This can be achieved by  redistributing either
consumption or leisure. There is no need to introduce negative marginal tax  rate inducing the
9 The  marginal tax  rate  formula found in Kanbur,  Keen and  Tuomala (1994) is of exactly the  same form,
however, the authors do not offer a clear interpretation  of the result.
14agents  to work  harder  and  subsidizing  them  at  the  margin  if the  same  effect on welfare can  be
achieved  by substituting  leisure  for  consumption.  This  reasoning  no  longer  holds  once  care is
taken  of poverty.  Even  if leisure still  increases  welfare,  it now has  an  opportunity  cost  in terms
of poverty.  Consumption  is more important  for this  planner  since it has  positive  effects on both.
The  planner  thus  subsidizes  at  the  margin  each  additional  earned  unit  of income,  for a  certain
segment  of the  poor  population,  to  reduce  the  amount  of  the  public  bad.  This  kind  of scheme
resembles  a great  deal to the  Earned  Income Tax Credit  (EITC)  policy which  refunds  paid  taxes
to the  deserving  working poor  and  fosters labor supply, see Eissa  and  Liebman  (1996).  In fact the
EITC  implies negative  marginal  tax  rates.  Once the  welfarist  planner  takes into account  poverty,
it switches  from a  system  of "subsidized  leisure" to  a system  of "subsidized  labor".
Since there  has  been argued that  the relevant  distortion  to be taken  into account  are the  social
ones,  let  us just  write  them  for the  extreme  points  of  the  distribution  using  the  transversality
conditions:
1 - s()  -P(x(n),  X*)s/IY  = 1 - stn)  73P.((n),  X*)sIY = 0.
This is exactly the condition  obtained  in the first best equation  (6), there is thus no social distortion
at the endpoints.  This is exactly the counterpart  of the classical result  of no (individual)  distortion
at the endpoints  as given for instance  by Seade (1977).  The discussion of this section  is summarized
in the  following:
Proposition  2  If  there is no  bunching  and everybody provides  some  labor, then  the  optimal tax
schedule is such  that
(i)  all the non poor,  except the most  able, face  a strictly  positive  marginal  tax rate,
(ii)  poor individuals  can face both negative  or positive  marginal taxrates,
(iii)  although there (might)  exist individual  distortions,  there are no social  distortions  at the
endpoints.
It  would also be interesting  to  analyze the  case where  with  the welfarist  optimal  tax  schedule,
some agents provide no work and then  check the effect of the  introduction  of poverty  on the result
of the  optimality  of induced  unemployment.
155  Explicit  Solution  and  Numerical  Simulation
5.1  A closed  form  solution
The high complexity  of the first order conditions makes the derivation of the general solution  of the
optimum income tax problem impossible. With further sinmplifications,  there are a few  papers that
provide closed form solutions of the optimal non-linear tax schedule. Among them are Lollivier
and Rochet (1983), Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) who apply the solution of the former authors to
a principal-agent  model, Diamond (1998)  who gives analytical expressions  of the marginal tax rate
for special distributions or utility functions and finally Ebert  (1992). The trick to obtain closed
form solutions of the optimal tax schedule is to consider preferences that  are quasi linear w.r.t
earned income (and hence labor).In this section, we use Ebert's example. Unlike him, however,
we are not interested in dealing with the cumbersome issue of bunching, which demonstrates the
relevance of the second order approach; instead we rather  want to focus on and emphasize the
role of poverty when it becomes  an important dimension  of the social policy maker's objective.
Suppose that  all the individuals have the same quasilinear utility function over consumption
and labor given by u(x, y) = v(x) - y, the true welfare of an n-agent, which also includes her
aversion to generalized  poverty, expressed in terms of pie- and post-tax income is therefore:
V(x, z, n, P(x*)) = v(xz)  - z - (n)P(x*),  for  n C [a,  n]  (11)
n
with v strictly increasing, concave  and twice continuously  differentiable. Defining  G(n) =  f (m)  din,
the solution of the problem PPB  (bunching excluded) is the following:
16y=  G(n)  (12.1)
l(n)  = n[G(-n)F(n)  - G(n)]  (12.2)
_P_(x(n),x_)+G(_)_-  nf(n)G(-i)-G(n)+GC()  (12.3)
t(n)  P(n3zP  )+x(n)  x  G(n)-G(-i)F(n)  (12.4)
( )-3p:,(?c(n),s^)+G-(-n)  +nf(n)[OSP(7x(n),x')+GC;i)]
V(n)  u(n)  - f(n)P(x*)  =  1 (K  + Jn v(x(m))dm)  -,3(n)  fJn P(x(n),  x*)f(n)dn  (12.5)
z(n)  n(v(x(n))  - u(n))  (12.6)
K  =  f  { [nf (n) -1  + F(n)] v(x(n))  - z(n)f  (n)} dn  (12.7)
The  first  remark  is that  when  poverty  is  not  a  matter  for  concern  or  in  a  society  that  is
indifferent  to  poverty  on  average,  this  solution  coincides with  that  of the  welfarist  planner  (see
Ebert  (1992)).  It  is also  impossible  to  directly  give  an explicit  solution  of the  after-tax  income
since this  latter  depends  on  both  the  poverty  line and  index.  However,  once they  are  specified,
consumption  levels can  be  computed.  The intrinsic  utility  level and  labor supply  function  are of
precisely  the  same form  than  under  the  welfarist  solution  but  one  must  keep in mind  that  these
functions  depend  on consumption  and  hence the  solutions  are  not necessarily  equal.
Suppose the ppb planner  inherits  the optimal welfarist planner's  tax  schedule  (x(n),  z(n)).  How
will this schedule  be amended  to take account  of poverty  and obtain  the  optimal  ppb  tax  schedule
(x(n), z(n))?  Let  us also denote  the  marginal  tax  rates  by t(n)  and  t(n)  with  obvious notations.
The discussion is given for "reasonable"  poverty lines,  i.e., poverty lines such that  there  exist both
poor  and  non-poor  people  under  the  optimal  welfarist  schedule.  First  of all,  one  observes  that
17the  marginal  cost of public  funds,  -y, and  p(n)  depend  only on the  productivity  distribution,  this
property  comes from the  quasi  linearity  of individuals'  preferences.  The  following, easily derived,
result  also comes from  that  property:
Lemma  3  Define n* such  that x(n*)  =  x*.  For quasi linear  utility  functions  as defined  by (11),
the optimal  tax schedule  considering poverty  as a public  bad is such  that:
(i)  x(n)  = x(n)  > x*  and t(n)  = t(n)  V  n > n* and
(ii)  x* >  2(n)  > x(n)  and t(n)  < t(n)  V n < n*.
The  nonpoor  individuals  under  the  welfarist  scheme  face  the  same  marginal  tax  rate  and
enjoy the  same consumption  under  the ne!w  tax  schedule.  On the  contrary,  all the  poor  face lower
marginal  tax rates  which induce them  to work harder  and they  also all enjoy higher consumptions.
The  aggregate  amount  of poverty  is therefore  lowered.  Note  however  that  the  poor  population
is still  the  same,  therefore  the  Headcount  ratio  has  not  changed.  In  terms  of distortions,  using
(12.4), it is easy to show that  the  social distortion  associated  to an n-agent  is equal to the marginal
tax  rate  the  agent  would face were the  planner  a welfarist one  i.e.  the  individual  distortion.  This
result  also is a direct  consequence  of the  assumed  preferences..  Indeed,  the  incentives  problem  is
in fact  completely  independent  of the  level of consumption  anid labor  in this  case  since we have
a[du(n)/dn]/az  =  1/n2.
There  is an important  property  worth  noting for poverty indexes that  satisfy  lim".  - . P', (x, x*)
0 V x,  as  the  FGT  indexes.  For the  ppb  planner  who  uses  such  indexes,  when  the  poverty  line
is very high  (converging  to  infinity),  its  optimal  tax  rate  converges to the  welfarist  optimal  rate
t(n)  Vn. This result  is quite intuitive,  indeed for high poverty  lines almost everybody  in the  society
will be  poor;  hence  altering  the  tax  rates  have slight  effects on the  aggregate  poverty.  The plan-
ner  itself then  feels powerless in front  of poverty  and  thus  prefers to  concentrate  on  the  intrinsic
welfare side of the  economy  accepting  the high level of the  "public  bad".
5.2  Numerical  simulations
In  the preceding  section,  a closed form solution  to the  optimal  tax problem,  when poverty  is taken
into  consideration,  has  been  derived.  It  corroborates  the  results  found  in the  theoretical  model.
18However, some Tesults are  still stated  in a general  form,  such  as the  negativity  of some tax  rates
at  the  lower tail  of the  distribution.  To have a more precise  idea about  the  solution,  we need to
specialize  even more the  example  and  take explicit  functions.
Let  us  assume  that  v(x)  =  Ln(x),  P(x,x*)  =  (a,_,)  and  f(n)  =  5/6  - n/S  for n  c  [1,41.
The example also assumes that  all the agents have the  same aversion to poverty  O(n) _  1 for all n.
The poverty  line has been set at  x* =  2.5. Let now see which tax  schedules  would be  implemented
by the  welfarist  and  ppb  planners  in such  a society.  First  of all, the  aggregate  poverty  levels are
of 0.279  and  0.063  respectively.  Poverty  has  been  sharply  reduced,  in fact  it  has  been  cut  to  a
quarter  of its  initial  level,  under  the  ppb  tax  schedule.  In  the  following  graphics,  the  functions
relative  to the welfarist  planner  are in bold,  while they  are in dashed  form for the  ppb one.  Figure
I shows the  consumption  enjoyed by the  agents under  the  different  regimes while  figure 2 displays
the  patterns  of the  marginal  tax  rates.  As demonstrated  in lemma  3,  all the  nonpoor  under  the
welfarist  regime  have  the  same  consumption  and  face the  same  marginal  tax  rate.  Turning  to
the poor,  the  switch  from the  welfarist  to the  ppb regime translates  into lower marginal  tax  rates
at  all levels which  induces  them  to work  harder  and  enjoy  higher  consumptions.  In  the  lowest
interval,  they  all face negative  tax  rates.  Note  however that  the  poor  population  is still  the  same
even though  aggregate  poverty has been reduced.  Finally, the  curve of welfarist  marginal  tax rates
represents  also the  curve of social  distortions  introduced  by the  ppb  planner.
[See  figure 1]
[See  figure 2]
How are  the  additional  resources  needed  to  increase  the  consumption  level of the  poor  gen-
erated?  The  answer  to  this  question  is provided  by  figure  3  which  displays  the  labor  supply
functions.  As predicted,  the  poor  work much  harder  in the  ppb regime  compared  to the  welfarist
one.  More  strikingly,  the  nonpoor  whose  consumption  is maintained  at  the  original  level  now
19enjoy  more leisure.  This  comes from  the  need to respect  the  incentive  compatibility  constraints.
For the  high  ability  persons  not  to  claim  the  earnings  subsidy  package,  the  government  has  to
increase their  leisure at  the  same consumption  level thereby  increasing  their  intrinsic  welfare.
[See figuie 3]
Switching  from the  welfarist  to the  ppb schedule  necessarily  implies  a tradeoff  between  aggre-
gate  poverty  and  intrinsic  social  welfare.  Since poverty  has  decreased  benefiting  to  all, one  can
expect  the  utility  derived solely from the  consumed bundle  to clecrease on average.  Figure  5 shows
that  with respect  to the  welfarist  schedule,  the high skilled workers  are those who gain  in terms of
intrinsic  utility  from  the  changing of policy while the  lower part  of the  distribution  looses in the
process.  Once true  welfare is taken  into account  by introducing  the  negative  effect of poverty,  the
gain  from the  welfarist  to the  ppb  schedule profits  to a  larger  part  of the  society  and  at  a greater
extent,  see figure 6.  However, the  poorest  of the  poor  are  again  the  losers, which  gives the  flavor
of a  "repugnant  conclusion".  In  fact  it is easy in this  example  to  make the  poorest  benefit  more
in  terms  of true  welfare by  assuming  that  aversion  to poverty  is a  decreasing  function  of ability
instead  of assuming  it constant.  Marginal  tax  rates,  consuniptions,  supplies  of labor  are still  the
same if social  aversion  to poverty  is maintained  at  /  =  1. For instance  p(n)  is decreasing  if one
thinks  that  poor  areas  are  more prone  to criminality  and  therefore  the  reduction  in poverty  will
profit  more to those  areas  in terms  of reduced  criminality.
[See figure 4]
[See figure 5]
Turning  to the  curves representing  net  individual  transfers  (figures 6 and  7), the  most  striking
result  in the  simulations  is that  the  individuals  at  the extremes  of the  distribution  (the  very poor
and  the  very rich)  pay  taxes  while  those  in the  middle  range  receive positive  net  transfers.  The
20tax  liability  curve  decreases  first,  confirming  the  negative  marginal  tax  rates  at  the  bottom  and
the  inducement  to  work hard,  before starting  to  increase.  The  tax  burden  of the  rich  has been
much  decreased  and  shifted  on the  poor  who  have to self-support.  The  welfarist  tax  function  is
the  strict  S predicted  by Seade  (1982).
[See  figure 6]
[See figure 7]
As  in Mirrlees  (1971),  the  tax  schedules  are  close to  be  linear.  There  is a  whole  bunch  of
bundles  that  were  available  under  the  welfarist  schedule  but  are not  under  the  ppb  one.  These
bundles  display  low pretax  and  postax  incomes.  They  correspond  to a high  leisure,  high poverty
type  of economy.  On  the  contrary,  the  ppb  planner  allows only  some  minimum  income  to  be
earned.  It  is worth  noting  that  the  poor  population  is the  same because  of the  class of poverty
indexes  considered  which,  as shown  by Bourguignon  and  Fields  (1997),  implies  transfers  to  the
poorest  of the  poor.  The  welfarist  tax  schedule  has  thus  been  amended  in such  a way that  the
increase in consumption  has  been greater the  poorer  the  agent.  It cannot  be optimal  to push some
poor  out  of the  poverty  trap  unless  this  is done  for all.  Indeed,  it is always,  in terms  of poverty
reduction,  more efficient to increase  the  consumption  of a poorer  individual.
[See  figure 8]
6  Conclusion
This  article has  tried  to tackle  an optimal  income tax  problem  in which the  planner  considers  the
comprehensive  welfare of the  individuals.  This  comprehensive  welfare is intended  to  capture  the
multidimensional  nature  of welfare which  is determined  by variables  the  individuals  have control
upon  and  others  that  go beyond  their  control.  The  only relevant  source  of  (dis)utility  that  falls
into  this  second  category  is taken  here  to  be  aggregate  poverty  and  its  implied  consequences.
21Income poverty  is assumed  to be a negative  aggregate  externality  that  lowers, possibly  differently,
the  utility  of the  agents.
In  the  complete  information  case, all non-poor  people receive  as  usually  a  lump-sum  income
transfer  while  poor  face a  Pigouvian  nonlinear  earnings  subsidy.  Once  ability  becomes  private
information,  the  planner  in assessing  the  nonlinear  optirnal  tax  schedule,  follows the  usual  rule
of equating  the  marginal  social benefit  to the  marginal  social cost  of extracting  a  unit of earned
income  from  any  agent.  The  novelty  is  that  poverty  reduction  now  enters  the  marginal  social
benefit  of transferring  income  to  the  poor.  This  can  lead to the  apparition  of  negative  marginal
tax  rate  at  the  lower end  of the  distribution  of  ability.  The  tax  schedule  then  provides  strong
incentives to the  less skilled people to work harder  and  help themselves  to get out  of poverty,  and
lessen by the  same token the  burden  on the  whole population.  This  tax  scheme resembles  a great
deal  to the  Earned  Income  Tax Credit  initiated  in the  United  States  in 1987 as  an extension  to
the  Tax Reform Act  of 1986.  As the  EITC,  the  schedule that  is proposed  here  creates  complex
labor  supply responses.  Numerical  simulations  corroborate  the  theoretical  results  that  have been
derived.  While  the  emergence  of  negative  marginal  tax  rates  overturns  the  famous  result  of no
distortion  at the endpoints,  it is shown that  this  result  can be restored  by focusing on social rather
than  individual  distortions.
More generally, we expect  the  analysis  to carry over to situations  in which the  comprehensive
welfare includes  many  other  sources  of utility  in addition  to poverty.  The  major  problem  will be
to find the  way to welfarize each item  and  express  true  welfare in a tractable  way.
22Appendix  A:  Solution  of the  First  Best
In  this  appendix,  only  the  first-best  problem  of  the  ppb  planner  is considered.  That  of the  welfarist  is
readily  derived  by setting  1 =  0.
Let us write  the  maximization  program:
f Max:  {u(x(n),  y(n))  - 3P(x(n), x*)}  dF.
{ subject  to  f,(z(n)-  (n)-R)dF  > 0
The  following first  order  conditions  are easily  computed:
[1] u.(x(n),y(n))  - OP.(z(n),x*)  = y,  [2] uy(x(n),y(n))  =  -ny.
Finally,  [3] 1 - s - 3P(x(n),  x*)/y  =  0, this  last  equation  gives the  size of the  Pigouvian  subsidy.  We
note  SW(x(n),y(n))  the  social welfare associated  to a given  allocation.
Proof  of  Proposition  1  (ii):  At  any  optimal  allocation  (x(n),  y(n)),  the  more  productive  individuals
provide  a higher  supply  of labor, i.e.  d-y(n)/dn  > 0.
It  is assumed  that  the consumption  and  labor  supply  functions  are differentiable.  Let us assume  that
there  exist  an interval  [no,nij  such that  9'(no)  =  0'(n1)=O  and y'(n)  < 0  Vn E]no,nl[,  the  less able work
harder  on this  interval.  Let  0 <  e <  Min{f  (n), n  E [no, ni]  be  a real  positive  number  that  exits  since
f (n)  > OVn). Consider  now the  allocation  (zi(n), y(n)),  such  that
1.  Vn E Ln,no[U]ni,H],  (z~(n),y(n)) = (()yn)
2.  for proportion  f (n)  - e of n E [no, ni],  (z(n),(n))  =((n),  (n)),
3.  for  a proportion  e of n  E  [no, nl],  (zi(n), y(n))  =  (z(no  + ni  - n), y(no  + n1 - n)).
2 and  3  are possible  because  of the  non  anonymity  of the  first  best.  The  planner  can  then  assign
different  allocations  to oherwise  identical  agents.
What  is the  social welfare level?  After  straightforward  but  tedious  computations  one can  show that
SW(zi(n),y(n))  =  SW(z(n),y(n))
+ eyf  [u(z(no  + ni  -n),  y(no  +  n  -n))  -u(z(n),  8(n))]  dn
- 13e  [P(z(no  + ni  - n),x')  - P(z(n),  z*)] dn
23Let  us operate  a change  of variable  by posing  m  =  no  +  ni  - n.  It  is then  easy to show that  the  last  two
terms  vanish.  The  social welfare  is thus  the  same with  both  allocations.  One could  have anticipated  this
since the  social welfare function  is symmetric  in the individuals  true  welfare.  The  aggregate  consumption
also is the  same  thanks  to the  symmetry.  What  about  aggregate  produced  income?
jny(n)f(n)dn  =  j  ny(n)f(n)dn+  |n.y(n)f(n)dn
n  ~  ~  ~~~n  fn
+I  ny(n)[f(n)  - Jrdn  +  E  ny(no  + ni  - n)dn no  nn
= Jny(n)f(n)dn+  EJf  n[g(no  +ni  -n)-  g(n)ldn
It is now sufficient to  consider  the  last  term  above,  we denote  (*).  Note  also fi =  (no +  ni)/2.
(*)/E  =  j  n[9(no  + ni  - n)  - p(n)jdn  + J  n[9(no  + n  - n)-(n)]dn Jnon
=  n[y(no  +  ni  - n)  -(n)ldn  +  /  (no  +  n  -n)[9(n)  -y(no  +  ni  - n)](-dn)
=  2nJn(n-n)[g(n)  - (no  +  ni  -n)Jdn
no
y(n) - y(no  +  ni  - n)  >  0 since  y'(n)  <  0 on ]no, n:[.  This  .mplies that  (*)  >  0  and  thus  (z(n), y(n))
cannot  be  optimal.
Proof  of Proposition  I  (iii):  For  efficiency reasons,  whatever  the  objective  of  the  planner,  the  more
able  always work  harder.  How is then  the  produced  revenue  redistributed  among  the  consumers?  From
the  first  order  condition  [1]:
-u(z(n),  9(n)) -x*P(z(n),xz)  =  u.(Z(n'),  p(n'))  -BJPx((n'),  x*)
After  some straightforward  computations,  this equation  becomes
9(n)
Xv(n)  u. 5(z(n'),  Y)dY  = ]  [)3P.. (X,  st)  uz  (X,  9(n))j dX
Take without  loss of generality  n  > n'.  Since  Pax >  0 and  ua,x < 0 the  integrand  at  the  right  hand  side is
positive.  Therefore
dx(n)/dn  *  u.,  > O
i.e.  consumption  is  decreasing  if  it  is Edgeworth-complemenr,  with  leisure,  constant  if preferences  are
separable  and  increasing  if it is Edgeworth-substitute  with  leisure.
Appendix  B:  Solution  of the  non-linear  income  taxation
The  resolution  of program  (PPB)  is achieved  by using  the  maximum  principle.  The  state  and  control
variables  must  then  be  defined.  We  choose the  gross income  z(n)  as  the  control  variable.  The  indirect
utility  u(n)  will serve as the  state  variable.  The resource  constraint  is directly  introduced  in the objective
function.  Since  the  utility  function  is monotonic,  it can  be  irverted  to  get  the  consumption  x(n)  as  a
function  of u(n)  and  z(n),  i.e.  there  exists  a function  T  such  that  x =  'F(u, z).  It  is easy  to  show that
24IPz =  -UzIUx  =  s  and  T.  =  1/U.  and  x(n)  is implicitly  taken  into  account  in  the  computations.The
program  of the  government  is therefore:
Max  [u(n)  - 3P(x(n), x*) + -y(z(n) -(n))]dF
subject  to
du
d  = U.(x(n),z(n),n)
The  Hamiltonian  is then:
H(z,  w,  un)  =  [u(n) - PP(x(n),  x*) +  y(z(n)  - x(n))]f(n)  + ,i(n)Un(x(n),  z(n),  n)  (12)
where  A and  -y are  the multipliers  associated  to the  different  constraints,  the  first  order  conditions  are:
au  =  (1-i3Px(-,x)'U+rna{z(n)  -zn)}Jf(n)+i.  '  =-p'
aH  =  [-flPz(.,x*)t  F +-{z(n)-x(n)}jf(n)  +/  =  O
/,u(I) =  M(n)  =  0.
The  last  conditions  are the  transversality  conditions.Rearranging  the  first  order  conditions,  one ends
up with  the,  slightly  modified,  traditional  equations:
-/z(n)U.sn  + (y(1 - s(n))  -.  Pz(,  x*)s(n))f(n)  - q'(n)  =  0,  (B  1)
*t'(n) + Ii(n)  Ir  + (I1- (gP.(,  x*) + -yI)U.)f  (n)  = °  (B.2) U.~~~~~~~~~~~~B2
with the  endpoint  conditions  4(n) =  4(n) = 0,
where (1-  s(n))  represents  the marginal  tax rate  which expression  can be obtained  from the first condition.
The  second condition  is a differential  equation  from  which we can derive  the  expression  of the  multiplier.
Let us write  the  expression  of the  marginal  tax  rate:
t(z(n))  =  (1 - s(x(n),z(n),n))  =  3Ps  +  4(n)U)sn  (B.3)
-y  yf
Transforming  the first  condition,  we obtain  another  differential  equation:
tt'(n)  + Is(n)  U-  + (1 + -y/Uz)f(n)  =  0  (B.4)
solving  these  differential  equations  directly  gives us the  following two  expressions  for  IL:
(=  J (n-  (P u  ))  exp (j(U.Iz/U)dm)  f(p)dp  (B.5)
8(n)  = f  (1+ u ) exp (  (Unz/Uz)dm)  f(p)dp  (B.6)
in the  first  equation  the  poverty  measure  appears  since  it  concerns  consumption,  but  one  can  im-
mediately  see  that  this  expression  vanishes  in  the  equation  concerning  z  the  earned  income  which  is
"independent"  of poverty.
25Appendix  C:  Solution  for  the  quasi  linear  case
A closed form solution  to the optimal  tax  problem is provided  in this appendix.  The consumers'  preferences
are taken  to be  quasi  linear  of the following form:
u(z, y)  =U(X)  -Y
where  for simplicity  everyone  is assumed  to be equally  averse  to poverty.  The  utility  function  is indexed
by the ability  and  rewritten:
V(z,  z, n, P(x*))  =  U(x,  z, n)  - IP(x*) = v(x)  - -- (  )
n
for  later  reference  we have:
U,,=  V'(x),  U=  =  1  1  - 1  = 0X  U..  =  (k  [ du(n) 1  =I n  nv-7(x)  nx))'  z  L dn  J  2
The  planner's  objective  function  is:
Max  n [u(n)-  3P(x(n),  x`)]dF(n)
under  the  incentive  compatibility  and  revenue  constraints.  UJsing equation  (B.6),  neglecting  the  term
relative  to bunching,  and  the  transversality  conditions,  it is easy to compute:
n= f(n  =dn=G(F)
wn
using  again  (B.6),  one obtains
A(n)  =  n[G(n)F(n)  - G(n)]
(12.3)  is easily  obtained  from  (B.1),  replacing  all the  terms  by their  explicit  expressions.  Hence:
OP. (x(n),  x*)  + G(n-)  = nf  (n)G(n)  - G(n) +  G(n)F(n)
v'(x(n))  f(n)
The  consumption  of the  workers is derived  from this  equation.  However,  due  to the  poverty  index which
contains  the consumption  level, one cannot  get the  consumption  as a functionof  n, f  and v only.  The  level
of consumption  for  the  different  individuals  must  be  computecl  once f  and  v are  specified.  Afterwards,
from  (B.3),  replacing  s by 1 - t,  we derive  the marginal  tax  rate
t(n)  =  )3PP(-(n),x*)  G(n)-G(-n)F(n)
)/3P(x(n),  x*)  + G(n)  + nf (n)[0P,,(x(n),  xz)  + G(n)]
To derive  the  labor  supply  function,  it is useful  to remind  the  first  order  condition
U.x'  + Uz'  = 0  O  nv'(x(n))z'(n)  =  z'(n)  =.  z(n)  = J  z'(m)dm  - K1
assuming  that  the  government  taxes  for redistribution,  R = 0,  the  revenue  constraint  is rewritten:
rn  r"~~~
|  z(n)f(n)dn  =  j  x(n)  f(n)dn
26that  is
j  [  mv'(x(m))x'(m)dm-K11  f(n)dn=  x(n)f(n)dn
K 1 =  Js [Jmv '(x(m))x'(m)dm-x(n)]  f(n)dn
nn
K1 =  j  . mv'(x(m))x'(m)dm  - x(n)  f(n)dn
n  n~f
=  jX  [/nv(x(n))  - v(x(m))dm  -(n)  f (n)dn -nv((n))
rn
=  j[(nf(n)  - 1 + F(n))v(x(n))  - x(n)f(n)]  dn  - nv(x(n))  =  K - nv(x(a))
Finally,  it is straightforward  to  compute
z(n)  = nv(x(n))  - j  v(z(m))dm  - K,
since u(n)  =  v(x(n))  - z(n)  we get
u(n)  (K  +  V(X(M))dm)
and
z(n)  =  n(v(x(n))-u(n))
Proof  of Lemma  3: To obtain  the  welfarist  planner  tax  schedule,  it is sufficient  to  take  B =0  in the
above solution.  Let us denote  the optimal  ppb  planner  solution  with  a 'hat'  and  that  of the  welfarist  with
a 'bar'.  Let  us first  prove  lemma  3(i).  Denoting  the rhs  of (12.3)  by 9(n),  we have
flP.($(n),  x*)  + G(n)  G()n)
VI  (^(n))  =2  (n)  =7v(x(n))'
27all  the  functions  in  the  rhs  of  (12.3)  are  well defined  and  therefore  0(n)  is single-valued.  From  the
above equation  we deduce:
v'(x(n))  3P.(x(n),  x*) + G(n)
,,_,  _,,_  ~~~~~~~for  all n
G(-n)
The  argument  n  is ommitted  in the  following without  any risk  of confusion.  Suppose  z  >  x*  >
for a  given agent,  this  implies  v'(x)  <  v'(x)  from  the  concavity  of  v.  Therefore,  the  lhs  of  the  above
equation  is  greater  than  1.  Coming  to  the  rhs,  Px($,  x*)  <  0  from  our  assumption,  hence  the  rhs  is
less than  1.  Contradiction.  Therefore  whenever  an  agent  is nonz-poor under  the welfarist  schedule,  she is
also non-poor  under  the ppb  schedule.  Moreover  since v is monotonic,  her  consumption  does  not  change,
because  the rhs is equal  to  1. Suppose  now x  < x* < 5,  implying  the  Ihs is less than  1, we have the same
contradiction  since  the rhs  is equal  to 1.  Therefore,  poor  people  under  the welfarist  schedule  remain  poor
under  the  ppb  one.  Since x  <  x*,  the  rhs is less than  1, again  using  the  concavity  of v, this  means  that
2  >  X,  i.e. even though  poor  remain  poor,  their  consumption  is increased.  The same  type  of argument  is
used to  prove lemma  3 (ii).
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Figure 1: Consumption Functions under the Different Regimes
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Figure 5: The True Welfare Levels
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